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ECONOMIC PREDICTION OF SPORT PERFORMANCES: FROM 
BEIJING OLYMPICS TO 2010 FIFA WORLD CUP IN SOUTH AFRICA 
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2
 
The most usual economic studies about sport mega-events are devoted to their economic 
impact or cost-benefit outcome. Just like other sport mega-events, FIFA World Cup has been 
the focus of ex ante and ex post economic impact studies, and cost-benefit analyses (Ahlert, 
2001; Horne, 2004; Kim et al., 2006; Kurscheidt, 2006; Preuss et al., 2008; Rahmann et al., 
1998; Szymanski, 2002). It is not surprising that a strand of literature has emerged about what 
would occur in South Africa in 2010, as far as economic impact is concerned, when hosting 
the next FIFA World Cup (Bohlmann and van Heerden, 2005; Maennig and du Plessis, 2007). 
The issue is all the more crucial when it is a developing country that hosts a global sport event 
(Andreff, 2001 and 2006).  
 
One upstream issue remains unheeded so far with regards to how a nation level of economic 
development may impact on its sport performance at FIFA World Cup while the same topic 
about Summer Olympics is well elaborated on in existing economic literature. The latter is 
based on econometric estimation of how much significant are the economic determinants of 
the medals won by each participating nation. A same methodology starts developing for other 
sport mega-events such as international cricket tournaments (Choudhury et al., 2007) and 
athletics as a specialised component of Summer Olympics (Heyndels and Du Bois, 2006), but 
not much as regards to FIFA World Cup. Our research question is: would a model based on 
economic determinants that is used for successfully predicting the distribution of medal wins 
at Olympic Games be able to provide an econometric prediction of major FIFA World Cup 
sporting outcomes? 
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  1We would respond the aforementioned question as follows. We start with briefly reminding 
the most interesting methodologies at work in estimating and predicting Summer Olympics 
medal distribution (1). Then we show how our own model has resolved the issue and 
predicted how many medals each nation has obtained at the 2008 Beijing Olympics (2). 
Thereafter, we go on comparing our prediction to actual outcomes of different nations in 
Beijing and to other prospective econometric studies on the same topic, a comparison which 
is absolutely rare in the literature so far (3). At this stage, it is necessary to understand why a 
similar prediction model has not yet developed regarding FIFA World Cup: a major reason is 
that the soccer World Cup outcome is rather unpredictable, not only due to high uncertainty of 
outcome, but because each FIFA World Cup final tournament is characterised by a number of 
“surprises” (4). Then we present how to adapt our model of Olympic medal prediction to 
FIFA World Cup by introducing, alongside with economic variables compared, some 
football-specific or “footballistic” variables (5). A model is estimated on the basis of FIFA 
World Cup results from 1962 to 2006 (6), and then used to provide a prediction of the semi-
finalists at the 2010 World Cup in South Africa (7). We conclude with a pinch of salt about 
the interpretation of such a prediction exercise. 
 
1. Economic determinants of Olympic medals 
 
A widespread assumption across sports economists is that the Olympic performance of a 
nation must be determined by its endowment in economic and human resources and the 
development of these resources. Thus, the starting point of most studies about the economic 
determinants of Olympic medals consists in regressing a nation’s medal wins on its level of 
GDP per capita and population. Notice that the growth in medal wins by one country logically 
is an equivalent decrease in medals won by all other nations participating to the Olympics. 
Therefore, if one wants to understand the Olympic performance of one specific nation, one 
has to take into account all other participating nations within the overall constraint of the 
allocated medals total during this year’s Olympics.  
 
A first study of Olympic performance determinants (Jolk et al., 1956) was combining 
economic variables, such as GDP per capita and population, with weather, nutrition, and 
mortality in the athlete’s home nation. Later on, in various studies, other variables had been 
considered as possible determinants of Olympic medal wins: protein consumption, religion, 
colonial past, newspapers supply, urban population, life expectancy, geographical surface 
  2area, military expenditures, judicial system and those sport disciplines taught at school. 
However, with the cold war period, another very significant variable emerged: a nation’s 
political regime. The first Western work attempting to explain medal wins by the political 
regime of nations (Ball, 1972) immediately triggered a Soviet rejoinder (Novikov and 
Maximenko, 1972), both differentiating capitalist and communist regimes. The first two 
econometric analyses of Olympic Games (Grimes et al., 1974; Levine, 1974) exhibited that 
communist countries were outliers in regressing medal wins on GDP per capita and 
population: they were winning more medals than their level of economic development and 
population were likely to predict. A last variable has been introduced, namely since Clarke 
(2000), which is the influence on medal wins of being the Olympics hosting country. The host 
gains more medals than otherwise expected due to big crowds of national fans, a stronger 
national athletes’ motivation when competing on their home ground and being adapted to 
local weather, and not tired by a long pre-Games travel. 
 
More sophisticated econometric methodology have been used in most recent studies that 
predicted Olympic medal wins, such as an ordered Logit (Andreff, 2001), a Probit model 
(Nevill et al., 2002) or an ordered Probit (Johnson and Ali, 2004); in the latter, a quadratic 
specification in GDP per capita is employed to capture a postulated inverted U-shaped 
relationship meaning that higher levels of GDP per capita have a positive but decreasing 
impact on medal wins below a threshold income level, above which the relationship becomes 
negative. The most quoted reference is Bernard and Busse (2004) whose Tobit model has 
been assessed as the most performing one and then used by Jiang and Xu (2005) and Pfau 
(2006). Bernard and Busse model is considered as the best achieved economic model for 
estimating and predicting Olympic performance, in which two major independent variables do 
explain the great bulk of medal distribution across participating countries: GDP per capita and 
population. Three dummy variables capture a host country effect, the influence of belonging 
to Soviet-type and other communist (and post-Soviet and post-communist after 1990) 
countries as against being a non communist market economy. Such dummies are supposed to 
capture the impact of political regime on medal wins.  
 
2. Predicting Olympic medals distribution in Beijing 2008 
 
Starting from Bernard and Busse, we have elaborated on a more specified model (Andreff et 
al., 2008) with a few improving emendations. The dependent variable is the number of medal 
  3wins by each nation: Mi,t 
3. Our first two explanatory variables are GDP per capita in 
purchasing power parity dollars (PPP $) and population. Both variables are four year delayed 
(t-4) under the assumption that four years are required to build up, train, prepare and make an 
Olympic team the most competitive in due time, four years later. That is, for explaining medal 
wins in 2008, we take the 2004 GDP per capita and population as estimators. A Host dummy 
variable is used to capture the host country effect, i.e. the observed surplus of medals usually 
won by the national squad of the Games hosting nation.  
 
Our first emendation to Bernard and Busse model regards the political regime variable: 
Bernard and Busse rather crudely divide the world into communist regimes and capitalist 
market economies which obviously fits with the cold war period. Since then, this is too crude 
when it comes to the so-called post-communist transition economies (Andreff, 2004 and 
2007) in particular with regards to the sports economy sector which has differentiated a lot 
across former socialist countries during their institutional transformation process (Poupaux 
and Andreff, 2007). Such differentiation has translated into a scattered efficiency in winning 
Olympic medals after 1991 (Rathke and Woitek, 2008). Our classification distinguishes first 
Central Eastern European countries (CEEC) which have left a Soviet-type centrally planned 
economy, in 1989 or 1990, and transformed into a democratic political regime running a 
market economy: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia (and Czechoslovakia until the 1993 split), Slovenia, and the GDR (until 
German reunification in 1990). Another commonality to this group is that these countries 
have all joined the European Union in 2004 or 2007.  
 
A second country group (TRANS) gathers new independent states (former Soviet republics) 
and some former CMEA member states which have started up a similar process of transition 
as the CEECs but they are lagging behind in terms of transformation into a democratic regime 
and some are stalling on the path toward a market economy: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Mongolia, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Vietnam. None of them has joined the EU so far or has really an 
option to do so. The two next groups have not been Soviet regimes properly speaking in the 
past, although they have been both communist regimes and planned economies. In the first 
                                                 
3 Bernard and Busse use the percentage of medal wins by each country i for Mi,t instead. Our regressions are 
calculated with both the absolute number of medals (Table 3) and the percentage of medals per country, and the 
results are not significantly different.  
  4one (NSCOM), we sample those countries which have started up a transition process in the 
1990s: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, China, Croatia, Laos, Macedonia, Serbia-Montenegro 
(and the former FSR Yugoslavia before the 1991 split). Two countries have not yet engaged 
into a democratic transformation and a market economy: Cuba and North Korea and must be 
considered as still communist regimes (COM). All other countries are regarded as capitalist 
market economies (CAPME), the reference group in our estimations. Table 1 exhibits uneven 
medal distribution according to political regime.  
 
     Table 1: Uneven medal distribution by political regime   
        
  1976 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 
        
CAPME                     
        
Number  of  medals  268 323 498 543 577 590 
Mean (variation coefficient)   3,3 (3,5)    2,2 (4,2)   3,3 (3,7)   3,3 (3,4)   3,5 (3,2)   3,5(3,2) 
Number  of  countries  81  146 151 164 166 168 
Countries with M ≥  1        35,8% 22,6% 32,5% 33,5% 26,5% 30,4% 
        
NSCOM                       
        
Number  of  medals  8  40 57 56 59 70 
Mean (variation coefficient)   8 (0)   13,3 (1,1)   14,3 (1,9)   8,0 (2,3)   8,4 (2,6)    10 (2,3) 
Number  of  countries  1 3 4 7 7 7 
Countries with M ≥  1        100,0%  66,7% 50,0% 42,9% 14,3% 42,9% 
        
COM            
        
Number  of  medals  15 0 40  30  29  32 
Mean (variation coefficient)   7,5 (1,0)   0 (0)   20 (0,8)   15 (0,9)   14,5 (1,4)    16 (1,0) 
Number  of  countries  2 1 2 2 2 2 
Countries with M ≥ 1     100,0%  0,0%  100,0%  100,0%  50,0%  100,0% 
        
CEEC                         
        
Number of medals  195  208  99  91  93  86 
Mean (variation coefficient)   32,5 (0,9)   34,7 (1,0)    11,0 (0,9)   9,1 (0,9)   9,3 (0,8)   8,6 (0,7) 
Number  of  countries  6 6 9  10  10  10 
Countries with M ≥ 1     100,0%  100,0%  100,0%  90,0%  90,0%  100,0% 
        
TRANS                  
        
Number  of  medals  126 132 114 121 143 153 
Mean (variation coefficient)   63,0 (1,4)   44,0 (1,7)   38,0 (1,7)   8,6 {(2,0)   10,2 (2,3)   10,9  (2,2) 
Number  of  countries  2 3 3  14  14  14 
Countries with M ≥  1        100,0%  33,3% 66,7% 71,4% 50,0% 57,1% 
        
 
  5In our model, we have introduced a last variable that captures the influence on Olympic 
performance of a specific sporting culture in a region. For example, Afghan ladies are not 
used to have much sport participation or to attend sport shows, even less to be enrolled in the 
Olympic team. As a result of these cultural (sometimes institutional) disparities, some nations 
are more specialised in one specific sport discipline such as weight-lifting in Bulgaria, Turkey 
and Armenia, marathon and long distance runs in Ethiopia and Kenya, cycling in Belgium and 
the Netherlands, table tennis, judo and martial arts in Asia, sprint in Caribbean islands and the 
U.S., etc. It is not easy to design a variable that would exactly capture such regional sporting 
culture differences
4, but we have considered that regional dummies may reflect them. For 
model estimation, we divide the world into nine “sporting culture” regions: AFS, sub-Sahara 
African countries; AFN: North African countries; NAM, North American countries; LSA, 
Latin and South American countries; EAST, Eastern European countries; WEU, Western 
European countries (taken as the reference region in our estimation); OCE, Oceania countries; 
MNE, Middle East countries; and ASI, (other) Asian countries. 
 
Table 2: Uneven medal distribution by sporting culture region of the world   
          
  1976 1988 1992  1996 2000  2004 
NAM          
Number  of  medals  122 106 163  156 155  153 
Mean (variation coefficient)  12.2 (2.4)  11.8 (2.6)  16.3 (2.1)  15.6 (2.0)  15.5 (1.9)  15.3 (2.1) 
Number  of  countries  10 9 10 10  10  10 
Countries with M ≥ 1     50,0%  30,0%  60,0%  60,0%  60,0%  70,0% 
AFN          
Number  of  medals  0 0 5  6  12  8 
Mean (variation coefficient)   0 (0)   0(0)    1 (1,4)     1,2 (1,1)    2,4 (1,0)   1,6 (1,4) 
Number  of  countries  3 5 5  5 5  5 
Countries with M ≥ 1     0,0%  0,0%  40,0%  60,0%  60,0%  40,0% 
AFS          
Number of medals  0  10  16  29  42  29 
Mean (variation coefficient)   0  (0)   0,3 (5,6)    0,4 (2,4)     0,6 (2,6)    0,9 (2,2)   0,6 (3,0) 
Number of countries  3  39  39  45  47  47 
Countries with M ≥ 1     0,0%  5,1%  17,9%  22,2%  21,3%  14,9% 
LSA                       
Number  of  medals  5 13 8  23  26  25 
Mean (variation coefficient)   0,2 (2,4)    0,5 (2,5)    0,3 (2,4)     0,7 (3,7)    0,8 (3,3)   0,8 (2,7) 
Number  of  countries  23 27 29  32 32  32 
Countries with M ≥ 1     17,4%  25,9%  20,7%  18,8%  12,5%  21,9% 
EAST          
Number  of  medals  328 352 214  217 233  245 
                                                 
4 Hoffmann et al. (2002a) consider that an important determinant of Olympic successes lies in the degree to 
which sport and sporting activities are embedded in a nation’s culture. The proxy used to capture such 
determinant is the total number of times a country has hosted Olympic Summer Games between 1946 and 1998. 
Our regional variable does not intend to capture only a nation’s sporting culture but how much it is specific 
(different from the one of nations located in a different geographical area).  
  6Mean (variation coefficient)   41,0 (1,0)    44,0 (1,1)    17,8 (1,7)    8,0  (1,7)    8,6 (2,0)   9,1 (2,0) 
Number of countries  8  8  12  27  27  27 
Countries with M ≥ 1     100,0%  100,0%  91,7%  74,1%  55,6%  70,4% 
WEU          
Number  of  medals  110 129 227  243 246  242 
Mean (variation coefficient)   5,0 (1,7)    5,4 (1,8)    9,5 (1,9)     10,5 (1,5)    10,3 (1,5)   10,1 (1,4)
Number  of  countries  22 24 24  24 24  24 
Countries with M ≥ 1     63,6%  58,3%  62,5%  66,7%  58,3%  62,5% 
OCE          
Number of medals  9  14  37  47  62  54 
Mean (variation coefficient)   2,3 (1,2)    1,3 (3,3)    3,1 (2,6)     3,9 (3,0)    4,8 (3,4)   3,9 (3,4) 
Number of countries  4  11  12  12  13  14 
Countries with M ≥ 1     50,0%  9,1%  16,7%  16,7%  15,4%  14,3% 
MNE          
Number of medals  2  1  12  11  11  20 
Mean (variation coefficient)   0,3 (2,4)    0,1 (3,6)    0,9 (2,0)     0,7 (2,3)    0,7 (2,2)   1,3 (2,2) 
Number of countries  6  13  14  15  15  15 
Countries with M ≥ 1     16,7%  7,7%  28,6%  26,7%  20,0%  33,3% 
ASI                       
Number of medals  36  78  126  109  114  155 
Mean (variation coefficient)   2,8 (2,5)    3,4 (2,7)    5,3 (2,4)     4,0 (2,7)    4,4 (2,9)   5,7 (2,5) 
Number  of  countries  13 23 24  27 26  28 
Countries with M ≥ 1     46,2%  26,1%  45,9%  44,4%  19,2%  37,0% 
 
Our first model is simply a specification à la Bernard and Busse, but with a differently 
defined political regime variable. Our estimation is based on a censored Tobit model since a 
non negligible number of countries that participate to the Olympics do not win any medal. 
Therefore, a zero value of the Mi,t dependent variable does not mean that a country has not 
participated and we work out a simple Tobit, not a Tobit 2 (with a two stage Heckman 
procedure). Contrarily to Bernard and Busse, we do not assume that preparing an Olympic 
team is timeless and, then, independent variables are four years lagged behind the dependent 
variable. Thus, GDP per capita is noted (Y/N)i,t-4 , measured in 1995 PPP dollars, and  Ni,t-4  
stands for population. Dummies are introduced to test whether the Olympic year is 
significant, taking 2004 as the reference. These dummies come out to be non significant. In a 
second model, we adopt a data panel Tobit, in order to take into account unobserved 
heterogeneity, whose test is significant
5, and then we opt for estimation with random effects. 
Our data
6 encompass all Summer Olympics from 1976 to 2004, except 1980 and 1984 which 
are skipped out due to boycotts which have distorted the medal distribution by country. Our 
first specification (1) is:  
                                                 
5 A test of maximum likelihood shows that the rho coefficient is significant (Pr = 0.00).  
6 Our data panel is not balanced since the number of existing countries in the world has increased between 1976 
and 2004, namely due to the break up of the former Soviet Union, former Yugoslavia and former 
Czechoslovakia (+ 20 countries), only partly compensated by the re-unification of Germany and Yemen (- 2 
countries).  
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Our second specification (2) is an emended variant of Bernard and Busse model, including 
our more specific political regime variable, but also the above described dummies standing 
for regions of sporting culture (Regionr,i): 
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In a third specification (3), the one used for prediction, we have introduced an additional 
variable Mi,t-4 on the right-hand side of model (2), just like Bernard and Busse who do not 
comment why they proceed in such a way. Our idea is that winning medals at the previous 
Olympics matters for an Olympic national team which usually expects and attempts to 
achieve at least as well as four years ago. Such inertial effect is all the more relevant for a 
nation eager to win as many medals as possible from one Olympiad to the other (a national 
‘Olympics cult’
7) and mobilise a lot of resources to succeed in. The resulting inertia 
differentiates those nations pulled by Olympics cult from those nations which are used to win 
zero or few medals. These two groups must be distinguished with using Mi,t-4 otherwise the 
prediction will be distorted.  
 
Table 3 - Tobit estimations of medals won at the Olympics   
  
Independent variables  Tobit Model 1  Tobit (panel) 
Model 2 
Tobit Model 3   
with lagged M 
Log population (t-4)           9,14***     4,15***       2,15***     
Log GDP per capita (t-4)       12,42***   5,44***   2,73***      
                                                 
7 Which has been fuelled in particular by the cold war, but it has not vanished yet in a number of countries.  
  8Host   24,37***     10,40***    10,04***    
Political Regime (ref. 
CAPME) 
  
COM                    24,34***    11,18***       5,76**     
TRANS                  23,24***    20,97***       8,15***    
CEEC                    21,43***    17,94***       6,71**     
NSCOM                  11,98***    8,06***        5,22*     
Region (ref. WEU)                
AFN                       -4,45*  -1,81 
AFS                       3,67*  0,75 
NAM                       7,93***  0,076 
LSA                       0,57  -1,08 
ASI                       -4,34***     -2,58*      
EAST                      -5,53*   -3,5 
MNE                       -5,00***     -2,47*      
OCE                       6,277**    1,3 
Year dummy  (ref. 2004)       
1976  4,63                              
1988  -0,2                              
1992  3,33                              
1996  3,35                              
2000  0,31                              
Medals (t-4)                                                   0,95***    
Constant                        -138***    '-51,30***   -31,57***      
Number of observations         941  941  831 
Log-likelihood value           -1646,1  -1551,5  -1224,2 
Pseudo R2               0,17  0,19  0,34 
*** Significant at 1% threshold; ** at 5%; * at 10%. 
 
All our estimations deliver significant results (Table 3). In the first Tobit estimation, all 
coefficients are positive and significant at a 1% threshold, except for year dummies. Thus, it 
is once again confirmed that medal wins are determined by GDP per capita, population and a 
host country effect. Political regime is also an explanatory variable, in particular in the case of 
communist and post-communist transition countries. Our second estimation (Tobit/panel) all 
in all exhibits the same results. The coefficients of regional sporting culture are significant 
except for Latin America, an area in which the North American sporting culture may have 
permeated namely through Caribbean countries and Mexico (classified in NAM).  
 
Since Western Europe is the reference a significant coefficient with a positive sign means that 
a region performs relatively better than Western Europe in terms of Olympic medals (negative 
sign means lower relative performance than Western Europe). Sub-Sahara Africa, North 
  9America and Oceania perform better. It is a little bit surprising for Sub-Sahara African 
countries since they are among the least developed in the world (except South Africa), but 
such effect is due to a few African countries which are extremely specialised in one sport 
discipline where they are capable to win a non negligible number of medals, such as Ethiopia 
and Kenya in long distance runs. With negative coefficients, North Africa, Asia, Eastern 
Europe and Middle East show a lower relative performance than Western Europe. It is not 
surprising for North Africa and the Middle East due to some restrictions to sporting culture in 
various countries. In the case of Asia, only few countries are capable to win a significant 
number of medals (China, both Koreas, Mongolia) given their GDP per capita. A surprise is a 
negative coefficient of Eastern European countries which are known as outliers or over 
performers (given their GDP per capita and population). In fact, the negative coefficient 
results from the variable Political Regime which already captures their over performance.  
 
Then, our model (3) is used to predict the medal distribution at Beijing Olympics: 
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Since we use here a pooling estimation
8 of Model 3, it may suffer from an endogeneity bias 
and the results may be biased by a correlation between the lagged endogenous variable and 
the error term. We have treated this issue with a dynamic panel GMM (Arellano and Bond, 
1991) which provides robust predictions, and predicted coefficients are close to those 
estimated with a Tobit. Predictions are published (Andreff et al., 2008) only for a sub-sample 
of countries
9 gathered in Table 4. 
 
Table 4 - Prediction of medal wins at Beijing Olympics   
  
  Medals won in 
2004 
Medal wins predicted 
in 2008 
Lower bound  Upper bound 
CEEC:       
                                                 
8 A test of maximum likelihood shows that the rho coefficient is not significant (Pr = 0.26) which allows to 
choose a pooling estimation.  
9 Result for any other country is available on request addressed to the authors.  
  10Bulgaria  12 12 10  13 
Hungary  17 19 17  21 
Poland  10 14 12  16 
Czech  Republic  8 10 8  12 
Romania  19 21 19  23 
TRANS:       
Belarus  15 17 14  20 
Kazakhstan  8 11 8  14 
Russia  92 96 93  100 
Ukraine  23 27 24  29 
NSCOM       
China  63 80 73  86 
Cuba  27 29 25  33 
CAPME:       
Germany  49 52 50  54 
Australia  49 51 47  54 
Canada  12 15 13  18 
United  States  102 106 103  110 
France  33 36 35  38 
Italy  32 35 34  36 
Less developed countries       
Brazil  10 12 10  14 
South  Korea  30 30 27  32 
Kenya  7 2 1  4 
Turkey 10  9  7  11 
Source: Andreff et al., 2008.  
 
The first-ranked predicted winner is, as usual, the United States, followed by Russia and 
China, which benefits from a host country effect. Most developed and democratic market 
economies (CAPME) are predicted to be among the major medal winners together with some 
pot-communist transition countries. Our forecast for France was between 35 and 38 medals 
while the State Secretary for Sports was hoping that the national team would reach 40.  
 
3. Predictions and actual results: what about the uncertainty of outcome? 
 
The publication of our article in French one month before the opening of Beijing Olympics 
rapidly became a hit in different French and European media and TV channels. First 
interviews asked to focus on our model prediction. In a second wave, after the Games end, all 
interviewers became eager to know for which countries the model had provided a correct or a 
wrong prediction and, in the latter case, why were it so. This triggered the writing of a follow 
  11up companion paper requested by the French National Institute for Sport and Physical 
Education (INSEP) to be included in its volume devoted to the overall outcome of Beijing 
Olympics for France (Andreff, 2009).  
 
Our model provided good predictions regarding those 189 countries for which data were 
available and computable: 70% of the observed results are in our predicted confidence 
interval. If one assesses our model prediction as acceptable when its error margin is not bigger 
than a two medal difference between prevision and reality, then it correctly predicts 88% of 
all Beijing results. The remaining unexplained 12% (23 nations) account for sporting 
uncertainty of outcome. The model correctly predicts the first ten medal winners, except 
Japan (instead of Ukraine), misses only four out of the first twenty winners, although with a 
slightly different ranking. However, the most interesting results are witnessed when the model 
is clearly wrong in its prediction that is basically for 23 countries, because it means that our 
five variables (plus the inertial variable) have not captured some core explanation of the 
Olympics outcome. Fortunately, economists are not capable to predict all the detailed 
Olympic results, otherwise why still convene the Games?  
 
Which are the major “surprises” delivered by actual results when compared with our 
predictions? The first one is quite bigger than expected medal wins by the Chinese team – all 
published predictions have been wrong in this respect. Our model has clearly underestimated 
the host country effect in China. Possibly, Chinese performance has also been boosted by 
some undetected doping
10. The second surprise is the underperformance of the Russian 
Olympic team, the worst since the cold war. It was regarded so much “catastrophic” that Mr. 
Putin convened the highest decision makers of Russian sport to command a new Olympic 
policy likely to avoid a repeated disaster at the 2012 London Olympics. In the same vein, 
some other transition countries, namely Romania, won fewer medals than expected in Beijing. 
The current state of reforming institutions and restructuring the whole sports sector in these 
countries (Poupaux and Andreff, 2007) has not been sufficiently captured in our model, 
despite our more refined political regime variable.  
 
The last three significant surprises are Great Britain, Jamaica and Kenya, the latter being the 
only two developing countries ranked among the first twenty medal winners. Early 
                                                 
10 This issue is discussed in depth in Andreff et al. (2008) explaining why we had not been able to integrate 
doping among independent variables despite we wished to do so.  
  12preparation of a super-competitive team for the 2012 London Olympics may have been the 
cause for higher than expected outcomes of the British team, as it is suggested by Maennig 
and Wellebrock (2008) who have introduced a “next Olympics host country” variable in their 
prediction. However, such future host country effect does not improve very much the authors’ 
forecast: 38 predicted medals as against 47 won by Great Britain. Without such effect our 
own model predicted between 32 and 35  medals for Great Britain. British medals 
concentration in cycling (12 medals) may trace back again to undetected doping and/or deep 
specialisation of a nation in one sport discipline. The latter is the most likely explanation for 
Jamaican medals concentrated in sprint and Kenyan medals in long distance runs. Though we 
have taken into account such specialisation through our lagged Mi,t-4 variable – Kenya had 
won 7 medals and Jamaica 5 in the same disciplines at Athens Olympics -, the inertia 
captured with this variable reveals to be insufficient.  
 
Different analyses devoted to Olympics outcomes have been published in 2008. Some are not 
based on economic approach and econometric forecasting. For instance, Wang and Jiang 
(2008) have used a strictly mathematical logarithm model, with no economic variable, 
regarding sport outcomes in one Olympiad as time serial, then data are treated with certain 
and uncertain time serial models. The prediction is rather good: nothing to say as an 
economist. Kuper and Sterken (2008) basically present a comparison between different 
econometric methodologies of medals forecasting and their results. On the other hand, Shibli 
and Bingham (2008), in a more management science approach, focus on forecasting the 
number of gold medals that China will win as the host nation. The study is based on an 
historical reminder of past Chinese Olympic performances concentrated on four sports and the 
women team, strong government support and the extensive use of performance management 
principles in preparing the Olympic team. The forecast is restricted to gold medals (46, an 
underestimation of the 51 actually won by China) and cannot compare with other studies. 
 
We are left with four econometric medal predictions for Beijing Games (Bernard, 2008; 
Hawksworth, 2008; Johnson and Ali, 2008; Maennig and Wellebrock, 2008) in order to assess 
the comparative relevance of our own model. We would not compare with Bernard (2008) 
predictions since they are close to ours, being based on Bernard and Busse modelling as well. 
All predictions were wrong in two respects: they underestimated actual Chinese medal wins 
and overestimated medal wins by the Russian and most Central Eastern European national 
teams. The poorest prediction regarding China (32 medals missing) is Maennig and 
  13Wellebrock’s. Their model does not perform well for a number of significant countries: USA 
(15 medals missing), France (9 medals missing), Kenya (12 medals missing) and Romania 
(10 medals in excess); it markedly underperforms our forecast for former Soviet Union 
(namely for Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine
11), except Russia, probably because it does not 
encompass any political regime variable (a weather variable is included instead). However, 
Maennig and Wellebrock predictions perform not that bad in two respects: they correctly 
predict exact medal wins for three countries (Finland, Indonesia and Ireland) and exhibit the 
best percentage of error
12 after our own predictions (see Appendix 1), with a 20.9% error over 
19 nations as against a 18.2% error over 21 nations with our model.  
 
Johnson and Ali (2008) dwell upon a model developed by the authors in 2004 in which a 
differentiation between individual and team Olympic sports is introduced. A last study has 
been realised by Pricewaterhouse Coopers (Hawksworth, 2008) on behalf of the hosting 
Chinese Olympic Committee. The econometric methodology is not crystal clearly made 
explicit but refers to both Bernard and Busse and Johnson and Ali. The variables retained to 
proceed with the forecasting exercise are: GDP per capita at PPP exchange rates, population, 
the host nation effect, whether a country was previously part of the former Soviet bloc, and 
the nation share in medal wins in the previous Olympic Games. These last two studies, 
regarding their published predictions, are comparable together (and with our model) for 21 
nations.  
 
No one of these two predictions had found at least one exact forecast with an equal number of 
expected and actual medal wins. In comparison, our model correctly predicts 4 results out of 
21. Given that these 21 countries have actually won together 648 medals, the percentage of 
error is 23.1% with Hawksworth forecasting, 34.3% with Johnson and Ali, and 18.2% in our 
prediction. Bilateral comparison between Hawsworth’s published and our expectations can 
extend to 30 nations. Hawksworth exhibits just one exact country prediction (Cuba) while our 
model delivers the correct medal wins 9 times out of 30; the error percentage is respectively 
25.3% with Hawksworth and 17.6% in our forecast. A comparison between Johnson and Ali 
(2008) and our results covers 35 nations: no one exact country prediction is found in the 
                                                 
11 Moreover no prediction is published for such a significant country as Cuba.  
12 The percentage of error is calculated as the ratio of cumulative erroneous medal numbers to real medal wins in 
the sample (or a sub-sample) of participating countries. For instance, with a sub-sample of 21 countries which 
have won together 648 medals, the denominator is 648. The numerator is 118 erroneously predicted medals with 
our model (ratio = 18.2%).  
  14former whereas 7 out of 35 predictions are correct in the latter with respectively 43.7% and 
23.4% error percentages.  
 
Finally, our model performs pretty well in predicting medal wins at Beijing Olympics when 
compared to the nearly “official” Pricewaterhouse Coopers forecast on behalf of the Chinese 
Olympic Committee and to the one with Johnson and Ali model. This confirms that Bernard 
and Busse methodology is the most performing so far, in particular when slightly emended as 
regards to the political regime and sporting culture regional variables.  
 
4. Prediction of FIFA World Cup winners: why it is so hard? 
 
The economics of the FIFA World Cup outcome is less developed than the economic 
approach to Olympic medal wins. There are two ways of explaining international soccer 
successes in the literature. The most common method is to explain FIFA points and ranking 
(the FIFA/Coca Cola World Ranking for all national football teams) at one point in time. The 
second one consists in explaining a nation’s success in FIFA World Cup over time. The 
economic determinants of the soccer World Cup outcome have only been touched three times 
in the literature so far (Monks and Husch, 2009; Paul and Mitra, 2008; Torgler, 2004), 
compared to over thirty papers of this kind devoted to Olympic medal wins.  
 
With the first method, Hoffmann et al. (2002b) report regression results identifying the 
variables influencing a nation’s performance in international soccer, as measured by the 
January 2001 FIFA points, with a sample of 76 countries that have won medals at the 2000 
Sydney Olympics. Inverted U-shape relationships are identified with respect to temperature 
(climate) and per-capita wealth, and a significant interaction is found between Latin cultural 
origin and population size, while both variables are individually insignificant. Macmillan and 
Smith (2007) start with stressing that the non random selection of Hoffmann et al.’s sample 
selects a disproportionate number of countries from the upper end of the international soccer 
ranking distribution. Thus, they rerun the regression with an augmented sample of 176 
countries. They confirm the earlier results with some differences: including a quadratic in 
population makes it significant as well as the population size. The authors add a history 
variable that records the year of the first international soccer match in each country, which has 
a negative and significant effect: there is a penalty to be a late comer in the realm of soccer. 
An additional dummy for each former Soviet republic except Russia has a negative effect, 
  15which is interpreted as the impact of their integration into the Soviet Union in the early 1920s, 
thus interrupting their national teams’ participation at the international level.  
 
A study by Houston et al. (2002), though not devoted to the FIFA World Cup outcome, is of 
interest regarding one of its explanatory variables. The authors analyse the economic 
determinants of a countries’ leisure and sport proficiency, taking international soccer and 179 
countries into consideration. The June 1999 FIFA ranking serves as the dependent variable 
and is used as a proxy for the proficiency of a given country in international soccer. 
Independent variables are both economic and ‘footballistic’: GDP per capita and its square, 
population, total number of previous World Cup appearances, youth World Cup appearances 
and the number of years (as a member) in FIFA. The major result is: higher FIFA ranking is 
associated with higher GDP per capita and bigger population, which converges with our 
results as regards to the Olympics outcome. The number of World Cup appearances is found 
to be a positive and significant determinant of leisure proficiency (i.e. FIFA ranking). 
 
Yamamura (2009) tests a catching up mechanism between Europe and Latin America, 
assumed to hold an advanced technology in soccer on the one hand, and developing nations in 
the football domain on the other hand. The dependent variable is the number of FIFA world 
ranking points of a nation and data cover the 1993-1998 period. The following explanatory 
variables are significant: total ranking points in the locality (neighbouring nations) which 
measure a learning impact from neighbours; average world ranking points for the four major 
European soccer leagues (England, Germany, Italy, Spain) as a proxy for the most advanced 
technology level in soccer; logarithm of the years a nation has been FIFA member, real GDP, 
and population. A catching up effect shows up. The number of World Cup appearances is not 
significant, contrarily to Houston and Wilson results.  
 
Leeds and Marikova Leeds (2009) dwell upon the previous references and use two dependent 
variables, FIFA points and the derived FIFA ranking in a cross section regression for 2006 on 
a sample of 178 countries. They test a number of independent variables but only some emerge 
as significant. For the purpose of adapting our Olympics model, let us notice that an 
institutional variable which is longer FIFA membership - assumed to mean that soccer is more 
embedded in a nation’s culture - is not significant while confederation dummies
13 are not all 
                                                 
13 Continental confederations into which FIFA is divided (see below). The authors capture this effect through the 
impact of placing a club in the confederation championship (like the UEFA Champions League) quarterfinals.  
  16significant. On the other hand, GDP per capita, population, the host country effect, and 
political regime (communist, former communist, non communist) have a significant impact 
on international soccer successes, in tune with our model for the Olympics.   
 
Despite the title of his article, ‘The economics of the FIFA football World Cup’, Torgler 
(2004) does not exactly model the economic determinants of the 2002 soccer World Cup 
outcome in Japan and South Korea. The dependent variable is a dummy that measures 
whether a team wins a game or not (1 = win) in the final World Cup tournament. Explanatory 
variables are not economic. A first variable captures the strength of a team through its FIFA 
ranking, and the positive influence on success of being the hosting team (home advantage). 
Since the soccer World Cup final tournaments “are not free of surprises”, a second set of 
variables is introduced regarding the performance of a team during the game: shots on goal, 
fouls, corner kicks, free kicks, off sides, cautions, expulsions, actual playing time (based on 
ball possession). Nothing like GDP per capita or population shows up in the model. The 
major result is that higher FIFA ranking leads to higher probability of winning the game: a 
one place improvement in world ranking increases a team’s probability of winning by 
approximately 1%, but this result is not always statistically significant. Higher number of 
shots on goal leads to a higher probability of winning; having a referee from the same region 
has a positive impact on the probability of winning a game, but this effect is not statistically 
significant
14. From the last result derives the recommendation of not appointing a referee who 
is from the same region of one of the contending teams.  
 
The first predicting model of the FIFA soccer World Cup outcome actually is the one by Paul 
and Mitra (2008). It is not much based on economic variables either. The authors start with 
reminding that in the past four FIFA World Cup tournaments, 1994 to 2006, the top team in 
FIFA ranking never won, except Brazil in 1994. However, they test the relevance of the last 
FIFA ranking published before the final round of the World Cup as a benchmark to evaluate 
teams’ performance. In a first Probit model, the dependent variable is a dummy that measures 
whether a team wins (1 = win, 0 otherwise) the game or not. The main explanatory variable is 
FIFA ranking with controlling for the number of goals scored by each team, the number of 
                                                 
14 We neglect the role of referees in this paper for two reasons: an imperfect referee is a source of competitive 
unbalance as demonstrated in Groot (2007), and a corrupt referee paves the way for another kind of study about 
corruption in football. We make the (rather naive) assumption that there is no match fixing and no rigged games 
even though it is definitely a simplifying assumption in current international soccer (Hill, 2009). Corruption in 
Italian football has recently attracted the attention of ‘non sport economists’ like Boeri & Severgnini (2009). 
  17yellow cards, and the number of red cards. A second OLS testing considers the scored goal 
difference as the dependent variable and the rank difference is the main independent variable 
with controlling for goals scored, the number of yellow and red cards, the number of corner 
kicks, the number of fouls, the percentage of ball possession, and match attendance. Empirical 
data are for the 1994 to 2006 World Cups. With regards to the results, higher FIFA ranking is 
significantly associated with higher probability of winning the game. Higher ranked teams 
score more goals. A more surprising result is that, though a higher number of yellow or red 
cards are less likely to win the game, in 2002 and 2006 World Cups countries with more 
yellow cards were more likely to win the game (and countries with more red cards in the 1998 
Cup as well). Other surprises are that more corner kicks and more ball possession are 
associated with losing the game
15. The authors’ conclusion is that overall the favourites or 
higher ranked teams have the winning trend in their favour, but there is a number of 
unexpected match outcomes, a conclusion joining Torgler’s notion of “surprises” and 
suggesting a rather good competitive balance in FIFA World Cup final tournaments. It is 
good for the FIFA World Cup uncertainty of outcome but it is why it is so hard to estimate its 
determinants and make prediction.  
 
The purpose of Monks and Husch (2009) is more to test whether the FIFA World Cup format 
may lead to a slightly rigged contest or, at least, whether it may favour certain teams, in 
particular the host country. The paper reminds that in the tournament history, only seven 
teams have ever won the World Cup (Brazil 5 times, Italy 4, Germany 3, Argentina and 
Uruguay 2, England and France 1). Of the 18 tournaments held to date, the host has won six 
times. The authors test the impact of seeding, home continent and hosting on the FIFA Cup 
outcome from 1982 to 2006. The dependent variable is a national team’s World Cup final 
standing (from the winner down to the 32th among the qualified), and it is regressed on a 
team’s FIFA rank before the World Cup, a dummy variable for being top seeded, a host 
country dummy, and a dummy variable if the World Cup is being played on a team’s own 
continent. Ex ante rank is positive and significant in determining a team’s final standing, as 
expected. Being top seeded results in an increase in final standing of approximately five 
places (significant at a 1% level) and the home continent advantage is approximately 2.8 
places (but not statistically significant). Both effects probably overlap with the host country 
variable (the host country is top seeded by definition) which provides three places better than 
                                                 
15 This may be related with low scoring and defensive tactics on the pitch analysed in Andreff & Raballand 
(2010); it is to be checked in further research.  
  18the expected final standing, but the result is not statistically significant. Rank, being the host 
country and playing on one’s home continent
16 determine advancement in the tournament to 
either the quarterfinals or semi-finals.  
 
Now we would take advantage of the previous results to introduce some emendations in our 
model in view of testing how much the determinants of Olympic medal wins and those of the 
FIFA World Cup outcome are similar or comparable and, then, attempt at predicting on such 
basis the outcome of the 2010 World Cup in South Africa.  
 
5. Adapting the Olympics medal model to estimating the determinants of the FIFA 
World Cup outcome 
 
From the above-mentioned studies it is clear that explaining the FIFA World Cup outcome 
with socio-economic variables such as GDP, population, institutions or political regime is 
much harder than explaining Olympics medal wins, for different reasons. Soccer is a sport 
discipline which is more widespread and developed in some countries (for instance some 
Latin American countries) than in others, whatever their level of economic development, the 
size of their population and their democratic or autocratic regime. Such specificity requires 
the introduction of some ‘footballistic’ variable in the estimation, contrary to the Olympics 
which cover so many sport disciplines that overall socio-economic development of a nation 
affects overall nation outcome, beyond disparities in performance across different sports – 
thus GDP and population are germane to capture a big share of the determinants. The number 
of “surprises” is much higher with the soccer World Cup than with the Olympics, first 
because in one case there is a rather high uncertainty of outcome which pertains to just one 
sport discipline whereas with the Olympics there are different levels of outcome uncertainty 
in different sports that, on average, compensate each other for the Olympic teams of big 
(population) and rich (high GDP per capita) nations.  
 
Another difference between the soccer World Cup and the Olympics lies in the comparative 
format of the sport contest. In most Olympic disciplines
17, after a preliminary knock-out 
                                                 
16 All the results are obviously plagued with endogeneity since the final standing is correlated with ex ante 
ranking (as demonstrated by aforementioned studies) and top seeding is determined by ex ante ranking. Neither 
an endogeneity test is provided nor a methodology to clean or circumvent it (ex.: endogenous regressor or 
instrumental variables) is implemented. 
17 Exceptions are team sports and some other sports such as tennis and table tennis.  
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(gold, silver and bronze) medals during the final. Thus it is not extremely tricky to build up an 
estimation of the determinants of medal wins - the first three ranked athletes (nations). It is 
more complex with the FIFA World Cup final tournament since this contest combines a round 
robin first stage before the 8
th finals and, then, a knock-out second stage from the 8
th finals on. 
The uncertainty of outcome markedly increases from the first to the second stage (Monks and 
Husch, 2009) and, thus, the impact of socio-economic variables might well dilute a little bit in 
the course of some knock-out games (thus the “surprises”). This lays ground for the choice of 
our dependent variable to have it as much comparable as possible with medal wins. We opt 
for the four nations reaching the semi-finals (Semifin) of the soccer World Cup final 
tournament. In other words, we look for the determinants of being one of the best four ranked 
teams in the final tournament – and this facilitates using the same estimation model as the one 
explaining Olympic medal wins. Of course, the best four ranked are the winner, the finalist 
and two semi-finalists which usually play a ranking game the day before the final
18. Given the 
dependent variable (being in semi-finals = 1; not being in semi-finals = 0), we estimate a 
Probit model.  
 
All national teams which have participated to the semi-finals are exhibited in Appendix 2 with 
their cumulative participation from the first 1930 World Cup in Uruguay up to 2006 in 
Germany. Retaining the semi-finalists as the dependent variable is also somewhat rooted in 
FIFA economic incentives. Given the FIFA distribution rules, each team entering the World 
Cup final tournament earns a 3.79 million € bonus. The next step – reaching the 8
th finals – 
increases this amount by an extra 1.59 million €, followed by an additional 1.90 million € 
bonus for reaching the quarterfinals. Then for reaching the semi-finals, there is a huge jump 
of 6.33 million €, followed by only 630,000 € extra to make it for the finals and winning the 
finals adds another 1.27 million € (Coupé, 2007). Thus, while in sporting terms winning the 
soccer World Cup is associated with winning the finals, in economic terms, it basically 
translates into reaching the semi-finals. 8
th finalists earn an overall 5.38 million € bonus, 
quarterfinalists 7.28 million € but semi-finalists earn nearly twice more: 13.61 million € (then 
14.64 million € for reaching the final and 15.51 million € for winning it).  
 
                                                 
18 In fact, our model can explain the ranking of the soccer World Cup further than the first four best but we focus 
on the latter as those having participated to semi-finals, finals and ranking matches between the two semi-final 
losers. 
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same socio-economic variables play a role in determining the FIFA World Cup outcome as 
with the Summer Olympics medal wins; b/ finding a sample of socio-economic and 
footballistic variables that explain the soccer World Cup outcome in the long run, in order to 
come up with an ex post benchmark model that can be used further in ex ante predicting the 
semi-finalists of the 2010 World Cup. Then, comparing the predicted semi-finalists before 
June 2010 with the actual ones ex post (after June 2010) will enable detecting the possible 
“surprises” – diverging results – in a next paper. Due to data availability, the retained 
observation period runs from the 1962 soccer World Cup in Chile up to the 2006 one in 
Germany in view of gathering enough data to provide a relevant estimation, which includes 
12 FIFA World Cup final tournaments. The data covers all national teams which have 
participated to soccer World Cup final tournaments since 1962 – that is 16 from the 1962 WC 
to the 1978 WC in Argentina, 24 countries from the 1982 WC in Spain to the 1994 WC in the 
USA, and then 32 countries from the 1998 WC in France on, i.e. 272 observations in total for 
each variable in an obviously unbalanced panel.  
 
Population (Pop) and GDP per capita (GDP/cap)
19 are the first two independent variables 
considered just like in our Olympics medal model (World Bank data). We add the squares for 
both variables (Pop
2 and GDP/cap
2), in tune with Houston et al. (2002) and Macmillan and 
Smith (2007), in order to control for possible decreasing returns of population and GDP per 
capita in terms of soccer World Cup performance. The expectation is that population would 
have a positive effect on reaching the semi-finals while the specificity of the football 
discipline may lead to no significant effect of GDP per capita. These variables are introduced 
in the model with a two year time lag under a similar assumption as with the Olympics: the 
economic size and level of development of a nation two years ago is the context in which the 
preparation and training of a national soccer team starts up. Moreover, in the two years after a 
FIFA World Cup, national teams are used to participate to a regional international contest 
such as the UEFA Euro or the African Cup of Nations; preparing the World Cup really starts 
up at the end of such contests (which means in t-2), learning from the performance of a 
national team in such these contests. Other variables of interest are: a World Cup semi-
finalists history variable
20, FIFA ranking, a host country dummy, a regional variable though 
                                                 
19 In fact it is more precisely GDP per 1,000 inhabitants that measures this independent variable.  
20 Such variable introduces some inertia into the model which is useful when the model is used for prediction.  
  21different from the one in the Olympics medal model, and the number of registered soccer 
players in the national federations of participating countries
21. 
 
In previous studies, it has appeared that a nation’s history in the football domain, such as 
World Cup appearances and the length of FIFA membership, matters to explain its 
international soccer performance. Given our objective of explaining semi-finals participation, 
we have elaborated on a specific semi-final history variable (SFstory) derived from the data in 
Appendix 2. It is calculated by dividing all the figures in Appendix 2 by the number of FIFA 
World Cup final tournaments from 1930 up to the year appearing in a column of Appendix 2 
(for instance, in the 2006 column, all figures are divided by 18). This variable describes the 
uneven long-term capacity or competence of a national team to reach the semi-finals in a 
historical perspective and eventually ranks the nations according to this competence. When 
one talks about ‘footballistic’ nations or football-involved countries, Germany, Brazil, or Italy 
are often mentioned: indeed, they have been the most frequent semi-finalists at FIFA World 
Cups. As in previous studies, FIFA rank is tested as one explanatory variable, taking FIFA 
ranking one month before the beginning of each World Cup, and a dummy (Host) is to 
capture the impact on performance of being the hosting country.  
 
A regional variable (Reg) is different from the one used in the Olympics medal model. The 
latter’s purpose was to capture something like a regional sport culture effect while in the case 
of FIFA World Cup it must measure the relative strength and density of elite football in six 
different geographical zones in which the FIFA itself is divided, that is: AFC for the Asian 
zone, CAF for the African zone, CONMEBOL for the South American zone, OFC for the 
Oceania zone, UEFA for the European zone, and CONCACAF for the North, Central 
American, and Caribbean zone. Preliminary qualification to the FIFA World Cup final 
tournament is organised in different ways (round robin or knock-out or both) in the different 
zones. Seeding of the final tournament round robin stage varies across years but is based on 
the successes of teams from each region in previous World Cups and organised in such a way 
as to assure that top seeded teams will not have to play each other until the second phase (8
th 
finals) of the final tournament (Monks and Husch, 2009). A last assumption to be tested is 
that a football-oriented nation, that is one in which the number of players is relatively high 
compared to overall population, must be successful in international soccer. According to a 
                                                 
21 Participating countries refer to those participating to the soccer World Cup final tournament. Our model does 
not attempt to explain the determinants of the qualification to the final tournament so far.  
  22pyramidal explanation of elite sport, stating that the larger the mass of sport participants at the 
pyramid base, the better the elite top, and most football-oriented nations would have a higher 
probability to reach FIFA World Cup semi-finals. The number of (registered) soccer players 
(Players) divided by population can capture such possible effect. 
 
Thus, the estimation of the determinants of FIFA World Cup semi-finalists relies on a Probit 
model: 
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where Φ is the cumulative normal distribution. 
 
However, the paucity of available data for FIFArank and Players has led to estimate three 
different models. FIFA ranking is only available since 1993, when FIFA started calculating 
and publishing it, whereas the number of registered soccer players in all national federations 
has been counted and published only in 2000 and 2006 (FIFA Big Count, 2000 and 2006), 
which markedly reduces the size of the data sample. Thus in a first M1 model the estimated 
relationship is:  
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In a second M2 model, FIFA ranking is introduced but the sample is reduced to four World 
Cup final tournaments (1994 to 2006): 
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Since FIFA ranking does not show up as statistically significant, it is excluded in a third M3 
model whereas the proportion (percentage) of registered players in the population is taken on 
board, assuming that this number for 2000 can be used for estimating the FIFA World Cup 
outcome in 2002: 
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With a small and unbalanced panel, Probit estimation is used as a first step. Then to tackle 
endogeneity of the semi-final history variable, a Probit model with endogenous regressor 
(instrumental variables) is resorted to. Valid instruments must be exogenous sources of 
variation in the semi-finalists, and it is difficult to think of candidate instruments relevant to 
explain international soccer performance (Macmillan and Smith, 2007). Thus, we retain as 
instruments those exogenous variables of the best previously estimated model.  
 
6. Socio-economic and ‘footballistic’ determinants of FIFA World Cup semi-finalists 
 
Before estimating M1 model, a preliminary testing has shown that adding year dummies in 
M1 comes out with none of these year dummies being significant. On the other hand, the 
semi-final history variable is significant at a 1% threshold, population and its square are both 
significant at 5% with expected signs, and GDP per capita and its square are significant at 
10% with expected signs. 
 
Table 5: Estimation of the determinants of the soccer World Cup semi-finalists 
Independent variable  Variable name M1 model  M2 model  M3 model 
Semi-final participation history  SFstory (t-4)  1.185 *  2.880 *  4.399 ** 
Population  Nt-2  0.019 ***  0.004  0.037 ** 
Population squared  (Nt-2)2  -0.001 ***  -0.00002  -0.0002 * 
GDP per capita (1,000 inhabitants)  (Y/N t-2)  0.004 0.012  0.361  * 
GDP per capita squared  [(Y/N t-2)]2  -0.0003 -0.001 -0.010  * 
Hosting country  Host (t)  1.958 ***  7.089   
Europe region  DEurope  2.233 ***  5.717 ***  0.750 
South America region  DAmSud  1.941  ***  4.614 ***  -0.313 
FIFA ranking one month before  FIFA rank (t)   -0.013  
Proportion (%) of soccer players  Players (t)     -0.049 
Constant    -3.649  *** -6.175 -5.575  *** 
Number of observations    272  120  64 
Pseudo R2    0.284 ***  0.361 ***  0.409 *** 
*** significant at a 1% threshold; ** at 5%; *at 10%.
 
  24Now, estimating M1 model shows that population and population squared are significant at a 
1% threshold; the size of the nation matters. Being the host country is also a significant 
determinant of reaching the semi-finals. The host country has nearly always advanced past the 
first round robin group phase of the tournament and rather often qualified for the semi-finals. 
We have tested the impact of belonging to each of the six regions on to qualifying for the 
semi-finals; it is not significant for four regions out of six. Taking these four regions as the 
reference, Europe and South America show up as significant variables at a 1% threshold. 
Being a European or South American team significantly increases the probability to be semi-
finalist (even more in the case of Europe than South America). Most semi-finalists have been 
either European or South American teams so far. The last significant variable, though only at 
10%, is the semi-final history variable. Having participated to past semi-finals has an effect 
on the probability to reach this stage again. Finally, GDP per capita (per 1,000 inhabitants) 
and squared GDP per capita are not significant. As expected, this is a major difference 
between the FIFA World Cup based on a single sport discipline and the multi-sport Summer 
Olympics. The latter’s outcome is influenced by the level of economic development in 
participating countries whereas the former is not.  
 
In M2 model, tested from 1994 to 2006, the introduction of FIFA ranking as a supposedly 
explanatory variable has a devastating effect. Most variables become non significant 
determinants of being semi-finalist, namely population, population squared and hosting the 
World Cup. FIFA rank itself is not significant either. The problem with this variable is 
endogeneity since its calculation includes each team performance (including being semi-
finalist) in the last three World Cup
22. FIFA ranking also interferes with the semi-final history 
variable inasmuch as its calculation encompasses the last three semi-finals taken into account 
in our historical variable. The host country effect fades away from the determinants of 
qualifying for the semi-finals, against the frequent host nation expectation that its team has a 
home advantage to qualify for the semi-finals This must be kept in mind by the Bofana 
Bofana, i.e. the South African soccer team, in particular for a country which does not belong 
to FIFA European and South American sub-divisions. However, overall, M2 model is the 
least satisfying and the most difficult to interpret even though it maintains the European and 
South American regions as highly significant determinants of reaching the semi-finals. The 
                                                 
22 The calculation formula of FIFA ranking includes, among other, a weighted average of the team’s three 
previous FIFA World Cup results.  
 
  25semi-final history remains significant at 10% and prevails over FIFA ranking as the relevant 
footballistic variable to be associated with socio-economic and regional variables in the 
determination of the FIFA World Cup outcome. 
 
The number of soccer registered players per inhabitant in each participating nation is 
introduced in M3 model instead of the FIFA rank. The estimation is run for the last two World 
Cups, which is in itself a limitation of M3. Then, the host variable is automatically dropped 
because there are only two observations. The number of registered players is not significant 
which may be interpreted at the world level as follows: soccer mass participation is not a 
determinant of a nation’s participation to the semi-finals of the World Cup final tournament. 
In other words, this seems to invalidate for soccer the pyramidal view of sport where the 
larger the pyramid base of mass participation, the higher (the better) the elite top of the 
pyramid,  i.e. the performance in international contests. On the other hand, population is 
significant again, the semi-final history variable is even more significant (at 5%) than in 
previous models while GDP per capita and squared become significant at 10%. However, the 
regional variables, Europe and South America, are not significant because only two World 
Cups are kept: in 2006, no South American team has reached the semi-finals whereas in 2002 
one semi finalist was neither European nor South American (South Korea).  
 
Finally, we have to check for endogeneity between the dependent variable and one 
explanatory variable, the semi-final history. The latter is influenced by each new World Cup 
results (semi-finals), though in the long run these results have an decreasing marginal effect 
on our cumulative variable in contrast with FIFA ranking (which is a weighted mobile mean). 
Thus, we use the semi-final history as an instrumented variable and all other variables taken 
on board in M1 model as instruments. First, the semi-final history variable is explained by 
population, population squared, GDP per capita and squared, hosting the Cup and regional 
variables (Europe and South America), and then the relationship between the dependent 
variable (qualifying for the semi-finals) and the endogenous regressor ‘semi-final history’ is 
studied.  
 
Table 6 shows that all the instrumental variables are explanatory of the semi-final 
participation history except the host variable. It is logical since the semi-final history variable 
is a cumulative percentage over 18 Cups whereas a country has been hosting the Cup only 
  26once - or twice
23. Now the model is quite consistent and close to our Olympics medal model 
since not only population and regional variables but also GDP per capita are highly significant 
determinants of the FIFA World Cup outcome. In fact, the only clear specificity of the soccer 
World Cup is that being the host country is not a comparable advantage to the one of hosting 
Summer Olympics. However, such reality has been blurred for a long time by the World Cup 
being always located either in Europe or South America until 1990. Since then, the number of 
exceptions to this former rule is increasing with a location in North America (1994), Asia 
(2002) and Africa (2010). 
  
Table 6 – Instrumental variables explaining the semi-final history variable 
 
Semi-final participation history  SFstory (t-4)  Coef.  P > |t| 
Population  Nt-6  0.001 0.001  *** 
Population squared  (Nt-6)2  -'7.98e-07 0.001  *** 
GDP per capita (1,000 inhabitants)  (Y/N t-6)  0.005 0.005  *** 
GDP per capita squared  [(Y/N t-6)]2  0.0001 0.024  ** 
Hosting country  Host (t)  0.079 0.144 
Europe region  Europe  0.147 0.000  *** 
South America region  AmSud  0.234 0.000  *** 
Constant   -0.828  0.000  *** 
Number of observations    256   
Wald Chi 2    27.77 ***   
 
The relationship between qualifying to the semi-finals and the semi-final history 
Qualifying to the semi-finals     Coef.  P > |t| 
Semi-final participation history  SFstory (t-4)  5.536 0.000  *** 
Constant     -1.611  0.000 *** 
*** significant at a 1% threshold; ** at 5%     
 
7. The prediction for the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa 
 
The model estimated with instrumented and instrumental variables as well as M1 model are 
now used to build up our prediction of the 2010 FIFA World Cup semi-finalists, taking the 
data for population and GDP in 2008, the cumulative semi-final history variable up to 2006, 
the host country (South Africa) and the regional variables (Europe, South America). The 
predictions are exhibited in Table 7.  
                                                 
23 The FIFA World Cup final tournament has been hosted twice in France (1938, 1998), Germany (1974, 2006), 
Italy (1934, 1990) and Mexico (1970, 1986). 
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Table 7 - Prediction of the four semi-finalists at the 2010 FIFA World Cup 
            
 Model with instrumental variables                        M1 model     FIFA rank 
Teams Rank  Proba*  Teams  Rank  Proba*  March  2010 
Germany 1  96.2%  Germany  1  55.6%  1.  Spain 
Brazil 2  92.9%  Italy  2  42.2%  2.  Brazil 
Italy 3  80.2%  Brazil  3  41.4%  3.  Netherlands 
France 4  47.1%  France  4  35.7%  4.  Portugal 
Most probable quarterfinalists          
Argentina 5  35.2%  England  5  22.1%  5.  Italy 
Uruguay 5  35.2%  Argentina  6  21.2%  6.  Germany 
Netherlands 7  24.6%  Spain  7  18.7%  7.  England 
England  8  16.0%  South Africa  8  17.5%  8. France 
Most probable 8th finalists             
Serbia 8  16.0%  Serbia  9  13.8%  9.  Argentina 
Portugal 8  16.0%  Portugal  10  12.6%  10.  Greece 
Spain 11  9.6%  Netherlands  11  10.7%  11.  Chile 
Chile 11  9.6%  Chile  12  8.8%  12.  Serbia 
South Korea  11 9.6%  Slovakia  13 8.6%  13.  USA 
USA 11  9.6%  Uruguay  14  8.4%  14. Mexico 
South Africa  15  5.4%  Greece  15  8.3%  15. Uruguay 
Greece 15  5.4%  Slovenia  16 6.5%  16. Australia 
* Probability to participate to semi-finals. 
        
The first four teams with the highest probabilities to participate to the semi-finals in South 
Africa are the same with both M1 model and the model tested with instrumental variables. If 
one interprets the two highest ranks (probabilities) as the most probable finalists, the former 
predicts Germany playing Italy in the final while the latter forecasts Germany playing Brazil. 
France is ranked fourth in both cases. Compared to the last published FIFA ranking (March 
2010) these results are strikingly different: the first four FIFA ranked teams are Spain and 
Brazil (potential finalists), then the Netherlands and Portugal. From this comparison, it seems 
that Brazil is the most widely admitted semi-finalist whatever the methodology used for 
prediction.  
 
How interpret the three differences between our models’ prediction and FIFA ranking? Our 
models derive the probabilities and rankings from long run economic, regional and 
footballistic (semi-final history) variables whereas FIFA ranking is based on most recent 
soccer performances during the past three years, as of March 2010. The latter is less stable 
  28and may well slightly change as of June 2010 since it depends on the game outcomes of all 
played games by all national teams meanwhile. Our rankings will be the same in June 2010. 
However the three rankings might well be at variance with the actual results of the 2010 FIFA 
World Cup because there is not such a thing as uncertainty of outcome in either our modelling 
or the FIFA points calculation. Then, in July 2010, it would be time to compare predictions 
with actual semi-finalists and derive from the possible observed differences which had been 
the “surprises” in the 2010 soccer World Cup outcome taking our model prediction as a 
benchmark.  
 
Although it is beyond the core purpose of our prediction, it is not without interest to note that 
13 out of 16 national teams are common to the three rankings exhibited in Table 7. If one 
goes as far as interpreting these rankings as a probability to participate to the 8
th finals, there 
is a good chance that Argentina, Brazil, Chile, England, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Serbia, Spain, and Uruguay would qualify for the second stage of the 
2010 soccer World Cup final tournament. Since our two models encompass a host country 
effect, both predict South Africa qualifying for the 8
th finals contrarily to this nation current 
FIFA ranking (88
th in March 2010). The US team makes it to the 8
th finals with our 
instrumental variable model and FIFA ranking (16
th in March 2010). It would be more of a 
surprise if Slovakia and Slovenia (M1 model prediction), South Korea (instrumented model), 
Mexico and Australia (FIFA ranking) were to qualify for the 8
th finals in South Africa. Of 
course, those twelve teams
24 which are not mentioned in Table 7 would be “big surprises” if 




Comparing the estimated determinants of Olympics medal winning nations and FIFA semi-
finalist nations paves the way for some confidence in basic economic variables (GDP per 
capita and population) as good predictors of sporting outcomes in both cases. Regional 
variables, though not identically structured, also matter in the determination of Olympics 
medal winners and soccer semi-finalists. Hosting the world sport contest is absolutely 
determinant in Summer Olympics where the host country benefits from a substantial bonus in 
terms of medal wins (this effect was very strong at the 2008 Beijing Olympics) whereas a 
                                                 
24 That is Algeria, Cameroon, Denmark, Ghana, Honduras, Ivory Coast, Japan, New Zealand, Nigeria, Paraguay, 
RDP (North) Korea, and Switzerland.  
  29similar impact does not play a significant – or only a much milder – role in the FIFA World 
Cup final tournament. This reflects in the predictions drawn from our modelling: hosting 
China was predicted as one of the three big winners at the Beijing Olympics while South 
Africa is not expected to qualify either for the semi-finals with M1 model or the quarterfinals 
with the instrumented model. Though our modelled predictions had been able to correctly 
detect between 70% and 88% of actual medal winners at the Beijing Games, they should not 
be interpreted, in particular in the case of the 2010 FIFA World Cup, as a prognostic about 
which teams will be the actual semi-finalists since no variable captures the uncertainty of 
outcome which obviously could create divergences – the so-called “surprises” – compared 
with our benchmarking models. We have surveyed in this paper a number of reasons why it is 
so hard to predict the outcome of just one single sport discipline’s world contest such as the 
soccer World Cup. Any economic prediction of sporting performance must be taken with a 
pinch of salt; with regards to FIFA World Cup, better a pint than a pinch. The uncertainty of 
outcome seems to be much higher in the soccer World Cup than in Summer Olympics, a 
preliminary conclusion which deserves further research.  
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  33Appendix 1: Medal wins at the 2008 Beijing Olympics: predictions versus actual 
outcomes     
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United States  110  87  -23  103  -7  103  110  yes     95  -15 
China  100  88  -12 89 -11  73  86  no -14  68  -32 
Russia 72  79  7  95  16  93 100  no 21  78  6 
Great  Britain 47  28  -19 28 -19  32  35  no -12  38  -9 
Australia 46  41  -5  26  -20  47  54  no 1  41  -5 
Germany 41 43  2  66  25  50  54  no  9 43 2 
France  40  30  -10 27 -13  35  38  no  -2 31 -9 
South Korea  31  27  -4  24  -7  27  32  yes     27  -4 
Italy 28  29  1  29  1  34  36  no  6 29 1 
Japan 25  34  9  37  12  37 41  no  12 35 10 
Spain 18  19  1  13  -5  20 23  no  2 19 1 
Netherlands 16  20  4 22 6  22  24 no  6 20 4 
Brazil 15  12  -3  10  -5  10 14  no  -1 10 -5 
Hungary 10  17  7  31  21  17  21  no  7 16 6 
Poland 10  14  4  24  14  12  16  no  2       
Canada 18  13  -5  17  -1 13  18  yes     14  -4 
Turkey 8  11  3  11  3 7  11  yes     10  2 
Bulgaria  5  13 8  23  18  10  13  no  5 11 6 
Greece  4  15 11  10  6  14  17  no  10 14 10 
Mexico  3  8 5  6  3  5  9  no  2 5 2 
South Africa  1  8  7  10  9  7  12  no  6       
21 nations  648  636  150** 701  222** 668 764    118** 637***  133 
Error in %      23.1%   34.3%      18.2%    20.9%
Ukraine 27  23  -4      24  29  yes     22  -5 
Cuba 24  24  0     25  33  no  1       
Belarus 19  15  -4      14  20  yes     15  -4 
Kazakhstan 13  9  -4     8  14  yes     8  -5 
Romania 8  19  11      19  23    11       
  34Czech 
Republic  6  9 3      8  12  no  2 10 4 
Indonesia 5  8  3      1  5  yes     5  0 
Thailand  4  10  6      5  8  no  1       
Iran 2  8  6      2  7  yes          
30 nations  756  761  191**    774  915    133**      
Error in %      25.3%          17.6%      
Kenya 14      2  -12  1  4  no -10  2  -12 
Norway 10     13  3  4  7  no  -3       
New Zealand  9      12  3  2  8  no  -1       
Denmark  7     12  5  6  9  yes     8  1 
Switzerland 6     12  6  4  7 yes          
Sweden  5      19  14  6  9  no  1       
Finland 4      13  9 0  3  no  -1  4  0 
Nigeria  4     5  1  0  2  no  -2 2 -2 
Thailand 4     5  1  5  8  no  -1  7  3 
Austria  3      11  8  6  9  no  3 8 5 
Belgium  2      11  9  3  5  no  1 5 3 
Israel 1      9  8  0 1  yes     4  3 
Tunisia  1      5  4  0  0  no  -1       
Ireland 3      12  9 0  1  no  -2  3  0 
35 nations  718     842  314** 811 837    168** 749****  180 
Error in %              43.7%          23.4%    24.% 
* Actual outcome within our confidence interval.                
** Absolute value.  *** Over 19 nations     
**** Over 33 
nations         
  35 
** Russia af *** Serbia Montenegro since 1998 
Appendix 2: National teams cumulative participation to the soccer World Cup semi-finals        
Teams  Until  1958 1962 1966 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986  1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 
Argentina  1  1 1    1 2 2 3 4 4  4  4  4 
Austria  2       2  2    2  2      
Belgium  0     0    0  1  1 1 1 1     
Brazil  3  4 4 5 6 7 7 7 7 8  9 10 10 
Bulgaria  0  0 0 0 0      0    1  1       
Chile  0  1  1  1  1       1       
Croatia  0           1 1 1 
(ex-)Czechoslovakia*  1  2  2    2  2       2 
England  0  0 1 1      1 1 2    2  2  2 
France  1   1    1  2  3     4 4 5 
Germany  3  3 4 5 6 6 7 8 9 9  9 10 11 
Hungary  2  2 2      2 2 2             
Italy  2  2 2 3 3 4 5 5 6 7  7  7  8 
Netherlands  0      1  2     2  2 3  3 
Poland  0      1  1  2  2      2 2 
Portugal  0   1        1       1 2 
South  Korea  0         0  0  0 0 1 1 
Spain  1  1 1      1 1 1 1 1  1  1  1 
Sweden  3     3  3  3    3 4    4 4 
T u r k   e y 0 1                   
USA  1          1  1 1 1 1 
Uruguay  3  3 3 4 4      4 4      4     
(ex-)USSR  **  0  0 1 1      1 1 1       
* Czech Republic after 1992  ter 1991 
   
(ex-)Yugoslavia***  1  2        2     2     2     2     2 
A blank means that a team has not participated to the final tournament this year. 
Since 1962, a non increasing figure means that a team has participated to the final tournament without reaching the semi-finals. 
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